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State of South Carolina) and the public have vital interests in the prompt
and fair resolution of habeas claims. 5 Further, the court found that the
court had a "'virtually unflagging obligation ... to exercise the jurisdic-
tion given them.' 6 Such an obligation became even more compelling
in light of the nature of the crimes and the length of delay in the case
before the court.
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
In its recounting of Spann's process through the judicial system, the
Fourth Circuit did little to hide its ire at the administrative burden and
delay occasioned by Spann's various motions. In its findings, the court
recounted the series of delays, extensions, and amendments won for
Spann by his counsel. The court balanced these against the federal
magistrate's "comprehensive ... careful0 and meticulous0 '"7 recom-
mendations--over two hundred pages of documents. Finding Spann's
5 Id. at 673.
6 Id. (quoting Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United
States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976)).
7 Id. at 672.
8 Id. at 673.
newly alleged state claim frivolous and refusing to add to the already
"embarassing length of time that has elapsed since the case was filed in
the federal courts," the court reversed and remanded to the district court
for determinations onthe two issues the district court had not yet formally
ruled upon.8
Virginia practitioners will want to make note of the court's growing
impatience with what it sees as administrative delays that work against
state and public interests.9 The net effect of such impatience for those
representing capital defendants would seem to be that errors and possible
remedies should be raised early and often. Saving them for later habeas
relief will most likely result in their loss.
Summary and analysis by:
Roberta F. Green
9 The United States Supreme Court has demonstrated similar
impatience in the area of requests for stays of executions. See In re
Blodgett, 112 S.Ct. 674 (1992). See case summary of Blodgett, Capital
Defense Digest, this issue.
DAVIDSON v. COMMONWEALTH
244 Va. 129,419 S.E.2d 656 (1992)
Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
On June 13, 1990, Mickey Wayne Davidson killed his wife, Doris
Jane, and his two teenage stepdaughters, Mamie Darnell Clatterbuck and
Tammy Lynn Clatterbuck. Autopsies revealed that each victim had been
beaten with a crowbar. Davidson's wife, Doris, suffered numerous
lacerations to her head and face, skull fractures, and bruises and contu-
sions to the brain. Mamie suffered the most extensive injuries, with
severe injuries to her head and face. Tammy suffered blows to her head,
face and chest.
A psychologist examined Davidson and found him competent to
stand trial and to make decisions regarding trial strategy. At the guilt
phase of trial, Davidson pled guilty to each charge of capital murder.
Before accepting the guilty pleas, the trial court heard witness testimony
and considered numerous exhibits. The court also examined Davidson
and determined that the guilty pleas were made knowingly, voluntarily,
and intelligently. The court accepted the pleas and found Davidson
guilty of the three capital murder charges. The court ordered a pre-
sentence investigation report.
At the penalty phase of the trial, Davidson's counsel advised the
court that Davidson had ordered counsel not to present any mitigating
evidence. Davidson then testified that he had been fully advised by his
counsel of the charges against him, his right to a competency evaluation,
and the possible sentences he could receive. He further testified that he
had waived the competency evaluation and that he had directed that no
evidence be presented on his behalf during the penalty stage. The court
then considered the evidence presented by the Commonwealth and the
1 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.2 (1990); Va. Code Ann. §19.2-
264.4(c) (1990).
2 Va. Code Ann. § 17-110.1 (1990).
3 Davidson v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 129, 138,419 S.E.2d 656,
661 (1992).
pre-sentence report and found that Davidson's conduct in the commis-
sion of the offenses satisfied the "depravity of mind" and "aggravated
battery" components of the Virginia "vileness" aggravating factor. I The
court sentenced Davidson to death.
A timely notice of appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia was filed
by Davidson's lawyers, but Davidson requested permission to waive his
appeal of right. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing and
found Davidson's waiver to be knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently
made.
HOLDING
The Supreme Court of Virginia conducted its mandatory review of
the imposition of Davidson's death sentence 2 and affirmed the trial
court's actions.
3
First, the Court confirmed the trial court's finding of two aggravat-
ing factors, depravity of mind and aggravated battery, either of which are
sufficient for the imposition of the death penalty.4 The Court also held
that the trial court was not "under the influence of passion, prejudice or
any other arbitrary factor" in imposing the death sentence on Davidson.
5
The Court further held that under the circumstances of Davidson's case,
the sentence of death was not "excessive nor disproportionate to the
penalty imposed in similar cases."
'6
Because the court treated these issues in a summary fashion under
its mandatory review, they are not fully discussed here. The focus instead
is on the duties imposed under Virginia law for presenting mitigating
evidence during the sentencing phase of a capital murder trial.
4 Id. at 135-136,419 S.E.2d at660. See Va. CodeAnn. § 19.2-264.2
(1990); Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.4(C) (1990).
5 Davidson, 244 Va. at 137-138, 419 S.E.2d at 661.
6 Id. at 136, 419 S.E.2d at 660.
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ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
In its mandatory review of Davidson's conviction and death sen-
tence, the Virginia Supreme Court addressed the issues that were
presented on appeal in light of the evidence presented at trial and
summarily affirmed the trial court's actions. The opinion reveals that the
trial court had heard evidence and argument from both the prosecution
and defense during the guilt phase of the trial. However, during the
sentencing phase, evidence was presented only by the prosecution. In
this respect, the Davidson case suggests an issue not directly presented
on appeal: what is defense counsel's obligation during the penalty phase
of a capital murder trial to present mitigating evidence despite a defendant's
request to the contrary?
The Virginia Supreme Court has not addressed the effect of a
defendant's demand that no mitigation evidence be offered during the
penalty phase of trial. There is no explicit statutory requirement in
Virginia that counsel for a defendant present mitigating evidence at the
penalty phase of a capital murder proceeding, nor have the Virginia
courts imposed such a requirement. However, Virginia Code Section 17-
110.1 does establish guidelines for the Virginia Supreme Court's man-
datory review of the sentence of death: "In addition to consideration of
any errors in the trial enumerated by appeal, the court shall consider and
determine: ... whether the sentence of death is excessive or dispropor-
tionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the
crime and the defendant."7
By refusing to allow defense counsel to present mitigating evidence
at the penalty phase, a defendant thwarts the Virginia Supreme Court's
statutory obligations under Section 17-110.1. If a defendant presents no
mitigating evidence, the Supreme Court knows little or nothing about the
defendant's background, education, personality, intelligence or other
circumstances. If no mitigating evidence is presented at trial, the
Supreme Court can hardly meet its statutory duty to consider both the
crime and the defendant in determining whether the sentence of death is
"excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases."8
Indeed, because the Davidson court found that a defendant is
prohibited from waiving the mandatory review of a death sentence,9
there necessarily would be a concomitant duty under Section 17-110.1
for defense counsel to present mitigating evidence at the penalty phase
in order to provide the Virginia Supreme Court with the necessary
information with which to fulfill its statutory obligation. Thus,just as the
Virginia Supreme Court has held that a capital defendant cannot waive
his appeal, a capital defendant could not waive his case in mitigation.
Under this interpretation of Section 17-110.1, if a defendant in-
structs his attorney not to present mitigating evidence at the penalty phase
and such evidence is, in fact, not presented, the defendant may present
two additional issues on appeal. First, the defendant can argue that his
attorney had a duty under Section 17-110.1 to present mitigating evi-
dence despite defendant's instructions to the contrary. Counsel's failure
to comply with this duty, therefore, denies defendant his right to effective
assistance of counsel. Second, the defendant can argue that the trial court
erred in not requiring defendant's counsel to present mitigating evidence
pursuant to the duty established by Section 17-110.1.
The American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice
7 Va. Code Ann. § 17-110.1C.2. (1990) (emphasis added).
8 Id.
9 Davidson, 244 Va. at 132, 419 S.E.2d at 658.
10 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice Rule 4-4.1 (2d ed. 1980 &
Supp. 1986).
11 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice Rule 4-4.1 cmt. (2d ed.
1980 & Supp. 1986).
12 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice Rule 4-5.2 (2d ed. 1980 &
Supp. 1986).
provide some further support for imposing a duty upon defense counsel
to present mitigating evidence at the penalty phase. Standard 4-4.1
requires counsel"to conduct a prompt investigation of the circumstances
of the case and to explore all avenues leading to facts relevant to the
merits of the case and the penalty in the event of conviction." 10 The
accompanying comments note that "this standard contemplates... that
an attorney should vigorously seek to ascertain all mitigating circum-
stances concerning the offense and characteristics of the defendant." 11
Standard 4-5.2 establishes the decisions which may be left to a
defendant after full consultation with counsel: the plea to be entered, the
waiver of ajury trial, and whether a defendant should testify.12 All other
decisions regarding trial strategy or tactics are the "exclusive province"
of defense counsel after consultation with the defendant. 13 This standard
would appear to place the decision on presenting mitigating evidence in
the hands of the defense counsel. There appears to be no requirement that
defense counsel defer to the defendant's wishes in such a situation.
Standard 4-8.1 on sentencing requires that defense counsel "present
to the court any ground which will assist in reaching a proper disposition
favorable to the accused." 14 Standard 18-6.3 further requires that "the
defense attorney should recognize that the sentencing stage is the time at
which for many defendants the most important service of the entire
proceeding can b performed." 15 This standard also establishes specific
duties for the attorney, including:
The attorney should satisfy himself or herself that the factual
basis for the sentence will be adequate both for the purposes of
the sentencing court and, to the extent ascertainable, for the
purposes of subsequent dispositional authorities. The attorney
should take particular care to make certain that the record of the
sentencing proceedings will accurately reflect all relevant
mitigating circumstances relating either to the offense or to the
characteristics of the defendant which were not disclosed
during the guilt phase of the case and to ensure that such record
will be adequately preserved."
16
The ABA standards may be used in conjunction with the implied
statutory duty placed upon defense counsel under Virginia Code Section
17-110.1 to bolster an argument on appeal that a defendant was denied
effective assistance of counsel by the failure to present mitigating
evidence at the penalty phase despite a defendant's instructions to the
contrary.
It is important to remember that a capital defendant is affected by a
host of emotional factors, ranging from shame and depression to bra-
vado, and often is at his or her most vulnerable point entering the penalty
phase. The emotional weight of having been found guilty or of entering
a guilty plea to a capital crime may lead a defendant to not want to
vigorously contest the death penalty - a decision that is almost always
regretted later.17 Defense counsel has the statutory, constitutional and
ethical duty to protect the defendant's long-term interests by zealously
pursuing the case in mitigation, even where the defendant does not wish
to do so.
Summary and analysis by:
Susan F. Henderson
13 Id.
14 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Rule 4-8.1 (2d ed. 1980 &
Supp. 1986).
15 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Rule 18-6.3 (2d ed. 1980
& Sum. 1986).
J Id.
17 Indeed, this is the case with Davidson, who has now indicated
a desire to pursue the appeals process.
